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The State's Burden of Proof at the Best
Interests Stage of a Termination of
Parental Rights
Brian C. Hillt

Parental rights termination proceedings implicate many
fundamental interests. Parents have a "fundamental liberty interest . . . in the care, custody, and management of their child
[that] does not evaporate simply because they have not been
model parents."' The child and his or her parents share "a vital
interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural
relationship." 2 The state, in turn, has an interest in preserving
and promoting the welfare of the child. 3 A petition to terminate a
parent's rights thus presents a court with the difficult task of
adopting procedures that appropriately balance all of these interests.
For example, consider the case of Angela Edwards. Ms. Edwards claimed that when she lost her two daughters to foster
care, she was trying to escape an abusive relationship with the
children's father. 4 Prior to seeking termination, Allegheny
County Children and Youth Services ("CYS") told Edwards that
in order to retain custody of her children, she had to take parenting classes, get housing, visit her daughters regularly, and submit to a psychological assessment. 5 Edwards completed every
task required of her by CYS.6 Despite Edwards's compliance,
t B.A. 1993, Yale University; M.A. 1997, University of Pittsburgh; J.D. Candidate
2005, The University of Chicago.
1 Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753 (1982).
2 Id at 760.
3 Id at 766. Every state has a statutory provision allowing the state to permanently
terminate parental rights in the interest of protecting the health, safety, and well-being
of the child. See Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Validity of State Statute Providingfor Termination of ParentalRights, 22 ALR 4th 774, 778-79 (1983).
4 See Barbara Stack, Lives on Layaway, Part Four:A Mother Meets Her Goals, but
May Lose Her Daughters (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette Special Reports), available at
<http'J/www.post-gazette.com/layaway/part42.asp> (visited May 3, 2004).
5 Id.
6 Id.
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however, the caseworker asked a judge to terminate Edwards's
7
parental rights.
In authorizing the caseworker to petition for a termination
of parental rights, CYS acted in accordance with the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997 ("ASFA"). 8 Emphasizing permanent placement as a goal of the child welfare system, ASFA directs state agencies to petition a court for termination of parental
rights once a child has been in state custody for fifteen of the
most recent twenty-two months. 9 The agency can avoid this obligation, however, if it can provide a compelling reason for preserving the parental relationship. 10 ASFA thus establishes a default
rule: state agencies will become advocates for termination absent
a compelling reason to do otherwise. 1 '
At Edwards's termination hearing, the state's own witnesses
provided conflicting testimony regarding the girls' relationship
with their natural mother. 12 Caseworkers testified that the girls
were terrified by their mother's visits. 13 A psychologist hired by
CYS to evaluate the relationship testified that he had been told
that visits between Edwards and her older daughter had stopped
for six months because they seriously upset the child. 14 The older
daughter had been in Edwards's custody for only the first six
months of her life, and subsequently had seen her mother for
7 Id. CYS had changed its goal for the two girls, from reunification with Edwards to
adoption by their foster parents. Stack, Lives on Layaway, PartFour (cited in note 4). The
children had spent four years with foster parents who had grown increasingly attached to
the girls. Id. The foster mother had repeatedly asked Edwards to relinquish her rights,
Edwards had repeatedly refused, and CYS finally turned to the courts to determine who
should raise the children. Id.
8 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub L No 105-89, 111 Stat 2115, codified
in various sections of 42 USC.
9 Id at § 103. As of September 30, 2000, the parental rights to approximately 75,000
of the 556,000 children in foster care nationwide had been terminated. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration on Children, Youth and Families,
The AFCARS Report #7 (2002), available at <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/
publications/afcars/report7.htm> (visited May 3, 2004). One commentator has argued that
ASFA has failed in its goal of reducing the number of children in foster care. See Richard
Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales from the Age ofASFA, 36 New Eng L Rev 129, 144
(2001) (noting that when ASFA was passed, 520,000 children were in foster care and as of
March, 2000, 588,000 children were in foster care).
10 Adoption and Safe Families Act § 103, 111 Stat at 2118.
11 See Madelyn Freundlich, Expediting Terminatihn of Parental Rights: Solving a
Problem or Sowing the Seeds of a New Predicament, 28 Cap U L Rev 97, 99-101 (1999)
(reviewing ASFA's mandates to file termination petitions and the exceptions to those
mandates).
12 See Stack, Lives on Layaway, PartFour (cited in note 4).
13 Id.

14 Id (failing to indicate who had told this to the psychologist).
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only two hours of each month. 15 Anticipating a tense reunion, the
psychologist was surprised when the older girl saw her mother,
16
ran to her, and "collapsed in her birth mother's arms with joy."
The psychologist testified: "That the girls are stressed by their
mother has been overstated." 17 Although he felt that the girls
had a stronger attachment to their foster parents, he stated that
8
"[tihey certainly have a bonding to the birth mother as well."'
Accordingly, the court needed to evaluate the contradictions in
the government's own evidence and determine whether terminating Edwards's relationship with her daughters would truly serve
the girls' interests.
Because termination proceedings implicate fundamental interests, courts have considered the appropriate burdens and
standards of proof for the government's allegations in parental
rights termination hearings. Regardless of how a state structures
its proceedings, the Supreme Court has stated that the state
must show that the parents are unfit before a court can determine whether termination would serve the child's best interests.' 9 Consequently, termination proceedings are sometimes
divided into two distinct stages: an initial "unfitness stage," and
a subsequent "best interests stage."20 A court can treat these two
stages as two phases of a single hearing, but the court must ad2
dress both issues before it can order termination. '
In Santosky v Kramer,22 the Supreme Court held that under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state
must support its allegations of parental unfitness by "at least
clear and convincing evidence" before it can terminate the rights
of natural parents. 23 This holding, however, does not apply necessarily to the best interests stage of the parental rights termination process. 24 Consequently, states have adopted a range of
15 Id.

16 See Stack, Lives on Layaway, PartFour (cited in note 4).
17 Id (failing to indicate who had overstated this to the psychologist).
18 Id.

19 Quilloin v Walcott, 434 US 246, 255 (1978).
20 See, for example, In re DT, 788 NE2d 133, 144-46 (Ill App 2003) (describing the
two stages of the parental rights termination process under Illinois law).
21 See In re Trejo, 612 NW2d 407, 411 n 6 (Mich 2000) (analyzing state court rules for
combining or separating the two phases based on the status of the case).
22 455 US 745 (1982).

23 Id at 747-48.
24 See DT, 788 NE2d at 148 (arguing that Santosky implies that a lesser burden of
proof could be permitted at a best interest hearing).
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different standards and burdens of proof to apply at the best in25
terests stage.
This Comment argues that the Constitution requires a state
to prove its allegations at the best interests stage of a termination of parental rights proceeding by at least clear and convincing evidence. Part I reviews the Court's decision in Santosky and
provides an overview of how state courts have responded to its
mandate. Part II analyzes the constitutionally protected interests of the child and then reapplies the Santosky framework to
the best interests stage in light of the child's ongoing rights. Part
III responds to two possible objections to this argument: (1) that
a heightened standard is unnecessary after a judicial finding of
unfitness; and (2) that a heightened standard would endanger
the children of unfit parents, or at least give too little weight to
the potential benefits of termination. After addressing these two
problems, this Comment concludes that a heightened standard in
this context would impress on the factfinder the fundamental
importance of the termination decision and require simply that
the government provide sufficiently substantial evidence regarding the child's best interests.
I. SANTOSKY AND THE REACTION OF THE STATE COURTS

A.

The Santosky Framework

The Court in Santosky established the general framework
for determining the constitutional requirements for the state's
burdens and standards of proof in parental rights termination
proceedings but did not specifically address the best interests
stage of such proceedings. 26 The Court in Santosky first reviewed
its analysis of the fundamental liberty interests of families in a
prior case, Quilloin v Walcott. 27 In Quilloin, the Court held that
freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 28 In dicta, the Court also stated that an attempt by a state
to break up a natural family would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment if the state did so: (1) against the objections of the
parents and the child; (2) without some prior showing of parental
25 See Part I C.

26 See generally Santosky, 455 US 745.
27 434 US 246 (1978).
28 Id at 255.
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unfitness; and (3) solely because termination served the best in29
terests of the child.
In Santosky, the Court extended this analysis of the liberty
interests of families by holding that even when the state attempts to "destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the
parents with fundamentally fair procedures." 30 The Court found
that "[elven when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of
their family life." 31 Accordingly, "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of
their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been
model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to
32
the State."
The Court then turned to determining the protections that
due process requires in parental rights termination proceedings.
The Court held that a court should determine the due process
requirements for such proceedings by balancing the three
"Mathews factors":33 (1) the private interests at stake in the proceedings; (2) the risk of error created by the state's proposed procedure; and (3) the state interests which support use of the challenged procedure. 34 Additionally, the Court held that the minimal standard of proof required by due process must reflect "not
only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but
also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be
35
distributed between the litigants."
Before using this principle to derive an appropriate standard
of proof for a termination proceeding, the Court reviewed its
analysis of the various common burdens of proof in a prior case,
Addington v Texas.36 The Court in Addington held that the factfinder in a civil commitment proceeding for mental illness must
29

Id.

30 Santosky, 455 US at 754.
31 Id at 753.
32

Id.

33 In Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319 (1976), the Court considered a constitutional
challenge to a termination of social security disability benefits. Id at 323-24. The Court in
Mathews listed the factors a court must consider when determining the specific dictates
of due process for a government procedure. Id at 334-35.
34 Santosky, 455 US at 754, citing Mathews, 424 US at 335.
35 Id at 755, citing Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 423 (1979) ("The function of a
standard of proof ... is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our
society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular
type of adjudication.") (internal quotation omitted).
36 441 US 418 (1979).
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apply an intermediate standard of proof: "clear and convincing
evidence." 37 The Court in Addington stated that the "preponderance of the evidence" standard exhibits society's "minimal concern" with the outcome and a conclusion that the litigants should
share the risk of error in a roughly equal fashion. 38 In contrast,
the criminal standard, "beyond a reasonable doubt," reflects the
magnitude of the affected private interest. 39 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard minimizes as much as possible the likelihood of an erroneous criminal conviction, indicating our society's conclusion that it should impose almost the entire risk of
error in criminal cases upon itself.40 Finally, the clear and convincing evidence standard applies when such a level of certainty
preserves fundamental fairness in a government-initiated proceeding that threatens the individual involved with a significant
41
deprivation of liberty.
In light of Addington, an application of the three Mathews
factors led the Court in Santosky to conclude that use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in parental rights termination proceedings contradicted due process. 42 Applying the first
factor, regarding the private interests at stake, the Court stated
that whether the threatened loss is sufficiently grave to warrant
more than average certainty turns on both the nature of the interest and the permanency of the loss. 43 Thus, the first factor
weighs against use of the preponderance standard, because in a
parental rights termination proceeding, the state seeks not only
44
"to infringe [a] fundamental liberty interest, but to end it."
The Court also rejected the argument that the child might
have a separate and contrary interest at stake in the factfinding
stage.45 The Court held that "[alt the factfinding, the State cannot presume that a child and his parents are adversaries." 46 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the factfinding stage does not
involve balancing "the child's interest in a normal family home
37 Id at 433.
38 Id at 423.

39
40
41
42

Id.
Addington, 441 US at 423-24.
Id at 425.
Santosky, 455 US at 758.

43 Id.

44 Id at 759.
45 Id at 759-60.
46 Santosky, 455 US at 760
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against the parents' interest in raising the child," but instead
47
pits the state directly against the parents.
The Court then applied the second Mathews factor-the risk
of error. 48 The Court's analysis of the risk of error proceeded in
two steps. First, the Court found that several factors common to
parental rights termination proceedings, in combination with a
preponderance of the evidence standard, would create too great a
risk of erroneous terminations. 49 Second, the Court weighed the
50
relative harms of erroneous terminations.
In identifying factors that would create too great a risk of erroneous termination, the Court noted that the parents subject to
termination proceedings often are "poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups," and thus "vulnerable to judgments
based on cultural or class bias."51 In addition, "[tihe State's ability to assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs the parents'
ability to mount a defense." 52 Finally, parents cannot use a double jeopardy defense against repeated termination efforts, and so,
after an initial failure to win termination, the state can try
53
again, perhaps gathering more or better evidence.
In weighing the relative harms of erroneous terminations,
Santosky held that a court could not assume that the termination
of the natural parents' rights would benefit the child. 54 The Court
also found that, for the child, an erroneous failure to terminate
would result merely in the preservation of an "uneasy status
quo." 55 In contrast, for the natural parents, an erroneous decision
to terminate would cause the "unnecessary destruction of their

41 Id at 759.
48 Id at 761-66.
49 Id at 764.
50 Santosky, 455 US at 765-66.
51 Id at 763.
52 Id.

63 Id at 764. It is not clear, however, how likely it is that the state would exercise this
option immediately. Perhaps it is more likely that the state would bring a new termination proceeding only after a new development in the child's case. Still, the child may remain in the state's custody or under the state's supervision following a failed petition to
terminate. Santosky, 455 US at 766 n 16. Consequently, after a relatively short period,
the state will often be able to plausibly allege the existence of new circumstances or evidence.
54 Id at 765 n 15 ("Even when a child's natural home is imperfect, permanent removal
from that home will not necessarily improve his welfare.").
55 Id at 765-66. The Court noted that under New York law, when the state failed in
its efforts to terminate parental rights, the judge had discretion to continue the child's
placement with an authorized agency or foster home. Id at 766 n 16.
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natural family."56 Weighing the harm to the child of an erroneous
failure to terminate against the harm to the natural parents of
an erroneous termination, the Court concluded that a standard
of proof that allocated the risk of error nearly equally between
the state and the parents would not reflect the relative severity
57
of the possible outcomes.
The Court then applied the third Mathews factor, which requires a court to consider the state's interests. 58 The Court held
that a standard of proof more strict than the preponderance of
evidence remained consistent with the state's interest in the welfare of the child.5 9 The Court found that the state's ultimate goal
is to provide the child with a permanent home, and "while there
is still reason to believe that positive, nurturing parent-child relationships exist, [that] interest favors preservation, not severance, of natural familial bonds."60 As a result, the state's interest
in terminating parental rights arises only when natural parents
clearly "cannot or will not provide a normal family home for the
child." 61 Accordingly, procedures that "promote an accurate determination of whether the natural parents can and will provide
62
a normal home" serve the state's goals.
Having applied all three Mathews factors, the Court balanced the factors and held that using the preponderance of evidence standard in parental rights termination proceedings vio63
lated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court further held that the states could decide whether their

56 Santosky, 455 US at 766.
57 Id at 766.
58 Id at 766-68.
59 Id.
60 Santosky, 455 US at 766-67.
61 Id at 767 (internal citation omitted). Prior to the passage of ASFA, the prevailing
child welfare philosophy held that, whenever possible, the state should keep families
together, and when separation became necessary, the state should take reasonable efforts
to reunify families. See Freundlich, 28 Cap U L Rev at 98-99 (cited in note 11) (describing
the history of termination proceedings). ASFA now mandates that the state petition for
termination whenever the child has been in foster care or agency custody for fifteen of the
most recent twenty-two months. Id at 100. In cases in which the state must exercise "reasonable efforts" to reunify the family, however, ASFA excuses the state from filing for
termination if the state itself did not provide the family with the services necessary for
the safe return of the child. See id at 100-01 (analyzing the mandates and exceptions of
ASFA).
62 Santosky, 455 US at 767.
63 Id at 768.
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courts would require that the government meet the clear and
convincing evidence standard or an even higher standard.64
B.

The Varied Standards at the Best Interests Stage Among
the States

Although the Supreme Court's holding in Santosky established a minimum standard of proof for the government at the
unfitness stage of a termination proceeding, it did not prevent
the states from adopting a variety of burdens and standards of
proof at the subsequent best interests stage. The Court held that
at the initial factfinding stage, a court could not assume that the
child and parent had divergent interests. 65 But the Court also
suggested that at a later, dispositional stage, a court might assume that those interests did diverge.6 6 Similarly, the Court
stated that the state's interest in terminating the natural parent's rights arose "only at the dispositional phase, after the par67
ents have been found unfit."
These statements might imply, as an Illinois Appellate
Court ruled in In re DT,68 that "a lesser burden of proof is permitted at the best interest hearing."6 9 The Illinois court noted
that the New York statute under consideration in Santosky bifurcated the proceedings into factfinding and dispositional hearings. 70 If the factfinding hearing ended with a judicial determination of parental unfitness, the court would determine at the dispositional hearing what placement would serve the child's best
interests. 71 Consequently, the court in DT stated, Santosky did
not hold that the state must prove that termination of parental
rights would serve the best interests of the child by clear and
convincing evidence. 72 Instead, the court held, at the best inter64 Id at 769-70. One commentator has argued that the states should adopt the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. See Douglas E. Cressler, Requiring Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt in Parental Rights Termination Cases, 32 U Louisville J Faro L 785
(1994).
65 Santosky, 455 US at 760-61.
66 Id at 760.
67 Id at 767 n 17 (emphasis in original).
68 788 NE2d 133 (111 App 2003).
69 Id at 148.
70 Id at 147.
71 Id (arguing that New York's factfinding hearing corresponded only to Illinois's
unfitness hearing, and New York's dispositional hearing was equivalent to Illinois's best
interest hearing).
72 DT, 788 NE2d at 147, citing In re DL. 760 NE2d 542, 549 (Ill App 2001).
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ests hearing the child's and parent's interests could diverge, and
therefore due process does not demand that the government
meet the heightened standard of proof from the unfitness stage
73
at the subsequent best interests stage.
The states, accordingly, have adopted a variety of different
approaches to the burdens and standards of proof required at the
74
best interests stage of parental rights termination proceedings.
Some states have required the government to prove that termination would serve the child's best interests by a preponderance
of evidence. 75 Other states have required the government to satisfy its burden by clear and convincing evidence. 76 At least one
state has gone further and required the government to prove its
case in parental termination proceedings beyond a reasonable
77
doubt.
Some jurisdictions have taken less conventional approaches.
Before the Illinois Appellate Court's decision in DT, the Illinois
courts had held only that the best interests decision fell "within
the sound discretion of the trial courts."78 In Michigan, once a
court finds that the government has established a statutory
ground for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing
evidence, the court must order a termination of parental rights
73 Id at 148, citing DL, 760 NE2d at 549.
74 See DT, 78 NE2d at 148 ("While . . . many states employ a clear and convincing
standard, several other states use the preponderance of the evidence standard.").
75 See, for example, id at 150 (holding that the usual standard of proof in civil cases,
preponderance of the evidence, applied to the state's burden of proof at the best interest
hearing under Illinois law); In re Guardianshipof Jolie S, 298 AD2d 194, 195 (NY App
2002) (applying the preponderance of evidence standard to the question of whether freeing the child for adoption by terminating parental rights would serve the child's best
interests); In re Dependency of AS, 6 P3d 11, 18 (Wash App 2000) (holding that under
Washington statutes, the state is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that a termination of parental rights would serve the child's best interest).
76 See, for example, In re JW, 779 NE2d 954, 959 (Ind App 2002) (holding that under
Indiana's parental termination statute, the state must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that termination serves the best interests of the child); In re ParentalRights as
to KD.L., 58 P3d 181, 186 (Nev 2002) (holding that to terminate parental rights, a petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination serves the child's
best interests); Conn Gen Stat Ann § 43a-717(g) (West 2003) (stating that a court may
approve a petition for termination of parental rights if it finds upon clear and convincing
evidence that termination serves the best interest of the child).
77 See State v Robert H, 393 A2d 1387, 1391 (NH 1978), overruled on other grounds
In re Craig T, 800 A2d 819 (NH 2002) (holding that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt not merely inadequate parenting but also specific harm to the child in
order to terminate parental rights at the best interests hearing).
78 See DT, 788 NE2d at 146. The court in DT noted that prior Illinois court decisions
had not analyzed the appropriate burden of proof, and held that the state bore the burden
of proof at the best interests stage and that "sound discretion" is not a recognizable burden of proof. Id at 145-46.
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"unless there exists clear evidence.., that termination is not in
the child's best interests."79 The Michigan court did not place the
burden of proof regarding the child's best interests on either
party, holding instead that the parent does not have the burden
of producing best interests evidence, that the court may consider
best interests evidence introduced by any party, and that even
when no best interests evidence is offered, the court may "find
from evidence on the whole record that termination is clearly not
in a child's best interests."8 0
This Comment accepts the proposition that the best interests stage differs, at least in some respects, from the unfitness
stage. Nonetheless, having made that distinction, a court should
then reapply the Santosky framework in order to determine the
required standard of proof at the best interests stage. Reapplying
the Santosky framework to the best interests stage demonstrates
that "clear and convincing evidence" is also the appropriate standard of proof at the best interests stage.
II. REAPPLYING THE SANTOSKY FRAMEWORK TO REQUIRE
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AT THE BEST
INTERESTS STAGE

In Santosky, the Court identified two categories of private
interests at stake in parental rights termination proceedings: the
fundamental liberty interest of the parents in the care and custody of their children, 8 ' and the parents' and children's shared
interest in preventing an "erroneous termination" of their natural relationship.8 2 Consequently, courts could consider both the
parents' and the children's rights when determining the state's
burden of proof at the best interests stage. As some courts have
found, however, a judicial finding of parental unfitness based on
clear and convincing evidence may diminish or even eliminate
the weight of the parents' rights when determining the state's
burden of proof in subsequent proceedings.8 3- This Comment,
79 In re Trejo, 612 NW2d 407, 414 (Mich 2000).
80 Id at 413-14.
81 Santosky, 455 US at 753.
82 Id at 760.
83 See, for example, DT, 788 NE2d at 150 (holding that once the parents have been
found unfit, although they retain a fundamental interest in the child, the parents' rights
must yield to the child's best interests); In re Trejo, 612 NW2d 407, 414 (Mich 2000) (holding that once the court has been persuaded by clear and convincing evidence of at least
one ground for termination, the liberty interest of the parents no longer includes the right
to custody and control of the children). The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that a
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therefore, focuses on the implications of the child's ongoing
rights, but argues that even with this shift of focus, due process
requires the government to prove its allegations at the best interests stage by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, before reapplying the Santosky framework to the best interests
stage, this Comment must discuss the nature of children's constitutionally protected rights.
A.

The Constitutionally Protected Rights of Children

A termination of parental rights may have significant consequences for the child. These consequences potentially include the
child's permanent loss of the right to support and maintenance
from the parent, the right to inherit from the parent, and all
other rights inherent in the legal parent-child relationship.8 4 The
Court in Santosky also stated that "[slome losses cannot be
measured," noting, for example, that the child in Santosky had
been removed from his parents when he was three days old, and
thus a termination of his parents' rights might effectively foreclose the possibility that he would ever know his natural par85
ents.
In general, the Supreme Court "has on numerous occasions
acknowledged that children are in many circumstances possessed of constitutionally protected rights and liberties."8 6 The
state, however, can limit such rights in order to protect the

best interest provision with no burden of proof on the state effectively served the parents'
interests and did not violate their due process. Trejo, 612 NW2d at 415. The flaw in this
argument is that the court did not consider the child's own independent right to prevent
an erroneous termination, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Santosky. The Michigan Supreme Court thus failed to properly reapply the three Mathews factors in light of
the child's ongoing rights.
84 Santosky, 455 US at 760 n 11, citing In re KS, 515 P2d 130, 133 (Colo App 1973).
85 Id.
86 Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 89 n 8 (2000) (Stevens dissenting). See also Planned
Parenthoodof Central Missouri v Danforth, 428 US 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights
do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age
of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."). For examples of Supreme Court decisions holding that children have
constitutional rights, see Board of Education of Independent School District No 92 of
Pottawatomie County v Earls, 536 US 822, 828 (2002) (holding that a child has Fourth
Amendment rights that are implicated by school searches); Parham v JR, 442 US 584,
600 (1979) (holding that children have a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment that is implicated by involuntary confinement for mental treatment); Tinker
v Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 US 503, 506-07 (1969) (holding
that children have First Amendment rights); In re Gault, 387 US 1, 13 (1967) (holding
that children have Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights).
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safety and well-being of the child.8 7 Unfortunately, the Court in
Santosky did not comment on how this framework would apply to
the best interests stage of a termination of parental rights proceeding. Nonetheless, in other contexts, the Supreme Court has
discussed relevant children's rights (such as the right to inherit,
the right to parental support, and a right to a relationship with
one's natural parents).8 8 These cases, taken as a whole, establish
that children have a variety of fundamental and constitutionally
protected interests at stake in termination proceedings. Consequently, the government's burden of proof at the best interests
stage should provide adequate due process protection to the
child's relevant interests.
1.

The fundamental rights to parental support and
inheritance,as analyzed in the context of illegitimacy.

The Supreme Court has had several opportunities to analyze
a child's rights to support and to inheritance in the context of
cases involving illegitimacy. The Court laid the foundation for
these discussions in a 1972 case, Weber v Aetna Casualty &
Surety Company,8 9 in which the Court held that a Louisiana
workmen's compensation law that did not provide equal recovery
rights to legitimate and illegitimate children violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 90 In determining the appropriate level of scrutiny, the Court held that
"[tihough the latitude given state economic and social regulation
is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court

87 See, for example, New Jersey v TLO, 469 US 325, 327-28 (1985) (holding that a
search of a student's purse by a public school official was reasonable and thus did not
violate the Fourth Amendment); Ginsburg v New York, 390 US 629, 640 (1968) (holding
that a prohibition on the sale of obscene materials to minors did not violate their constitutional rights).
88 See, for example, Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762, 776 (1976) (invalidating a state
law that allowed only legitimate children to inherit by intestate succession because it did
not provide equal protection to an illegitimate child's right to inherit from his or her
natural parent); Mills v Habluetzel, 456 US 91, 101 (1982) (invalidating a state law requiring that suits for paternity support for illegitimate children be brought before the
child is one year old because it emasculated an illegitimate child's right to parental support). Consider Bowen v Gilliard, 483 US 587, 601-03 (1987) (implying that choices involving family living arrangements involve fundamental rights but upholding a welfare
scheme that did not directly intrude on those choices even though some families might
modify their arrangements in order to avoid the effects of the scheme).
89 406 US 164 (1972).
90 Id at 165.
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exercises a stricter scrutiny." 91 The Court then stated that while
the status of illegitimacy historically has expressed society's condemnation of "irresponsible liaisons," it would be "illogical and
unjust" to visit this condemnation on an infant. 92 The Court held
that imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child would contravene the basic principle that legal burdens should arise from in93
dividual responsibility or wrongdoing.
The Supreme Court's decision in Weber suggests two important principles. First, the right of children to receive material
benefits from their natural parents embodies particularly sensitive and fundamental personal interests. Consequently, a denial
of that right warrants heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 94 Second, misconduct on the part of a parent alone
95
cannot justify depriving a child of such a right.
The Court applied these same principles to a child's right to
inherit from a natural parent in Trimble v Gordon.96 Trimble
involved an Illinois probate act that allowed only legitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from their natural fathers.9 7 Again, the Court held that a restriction on a child's right
to inherit based on illegitimacy violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 98
The Court then applied the principles established in these
cases to the procedures by which an illegitimate child could ob91 Id at 172.
92 Id at 175.
93 Weber, 406 US at 175.
94 See id at 173 (holding that in an equal protection case, courts must ask whether
the challenged classification endangers "fundamental personal rights").
95 See also Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 220 (1982) ("[L]egislation directing the onus of a
parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions
ofjustice."). The Court extended these principles the following year in Gomez v Perez, 409
US 535 (1973). Gomez addressed a Texas statutory scheme which granted children a
judicially enforceable right to receive support from their natural fathers. Id at 537-38.
The statute, however, granted this right only to legitimate children, and the Court held

that this scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id at 538. In a per curiam decision, the Court held that once a state makes such a right judicially enforceable, the fact
that the parents are unmarried is not a "constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right" to a child. Id. As in Weber, the Court found that to deny such
a right to a child because of the parents' wrongdoing would be "illogical and unjust." Gomez, 409 US at 538.
96 430 US 762 (1977).

-7 Id at 776.
98 Id. Of course, if termination is followed by adoption, the child may be compensated
for the loss of one set of inheritance rights by the acquisition of a second set of rights.
This possibility, however, should not relieve the government of its burden to show that
termination would clearly be in the child's best interests. See Part III B.
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tain support. In a 1982 case, Mills v Habluetzel,99 the Court invalidated a Texas statute requiring that paternity suits for the
purpose of obtaining parental support for an illegitimate child be
brought before the child is one year old. 100 The Court noted that a
state normally can set periods of limitation for bringing civil
suits without a risk of violating the Constitution.10 ' The Court
held, however, that the Texas statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment because it had the "unusual effect of emasculating a
right which the Equal Protection Clause requires the State to
10 2
provide to illegitimate children."
The Court's holding in Mills implies that once a state accepts the task of protecting a child's right to benefit from his or
her relationships with a natural parent, the child's relevant interests are sufficiently fundamental such that the manner in
which the state protects those interests should face heightened
scrutiny by the courts. In particular, states cannot withdraw protection from such rights merely on the basis of the parents'
wrongdoing. 0 3 Moreover, the state should give children an "adequate opportunity" to secure the state's protection of these rights
in court. 0 4
2.

The connections between the child's fundamental
interests and the reciprocalrelationshipbetween the

child's interests and the parents' interests.
The Supreme Court's illegitimacy cases established the fundamental nature of children's interests in receiving support and
99 456 US 91 (1982).
100 Id at 101.
101 Id at 101 n 9.
102 Id. In a similar case, Pickett v Brown, 462 US 1 (1983), the Court invalidated Tennessee's requirement that paternity suits be brought before the child is two years old. Id
at 18. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan emphasized that such a law denied equal
protection to the relevant children. Id at 16 n 15 (stating that while the mother generally
possesses the right to file a paternity action, the child's interests are at stake, because the
father owes a duty of support to the child, not to the mother). Justice Brennan added that
the child also has "an interest in establishing a relationship to his father," which provides
another reason for assessing these restrictive periods of limitation in light of the interests
of the child. Id. The connection in this passage between the child's rights to support and
to a relationship with a natural parent presaged Justice Brennan's dissent in Bowen v
Gillard,483 US 587, 609 (1987). See Part II A 2.
1O3 See Mills, 456 US 101 n 8 (rejecting the position that the state can limit the opportunity to obtain support in order to encourage marriage and discourage having illegitimate children).
104 See id at 100 (holding that Texas's one year statute of limitations failed to give a
child an adequate opportunity to obtain support).
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inheritance from their natural parents. Writing in dissent in
Bowen v Gilliard,105 Justice Brennan elaborated on the fundamental connection between children's material and relational
interests, and the reciprocal relationship between the interests of
children and the interests of their parents. 10 6 Unfortunately, the
Court itself has never provided such an analysis, although on
several occasions the Court arguably has implied its acceptance
07
of these principles.
In Bowen, the Court upheld a federal welfare scheme. 0 8 The
scheme required a family seeking benefits to include within its
"filing unit" children receiving support payments from a noncustodial parent. 10 9 This requirement increased the family's income for the purposes of determining the family's benefits because the scheme treated such support payments as part of the
child's income. 110 The majority rejected the claim that under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, this welfare law
should undergo heightened scrutiny."' The Court held that the
law did not "directly and substantially interfere with family liv12
ing arrangements and thereby burden a fundamental right.""
The Court did not hold, however, that a government could more
directly interfere with family arrangements or more substantially burden fundamental familial rights without facing heightened scrutiny.
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that by forcing the family to choose between lowering the family's benefits and modify105 483 US 587 (1987).
106 Id at 611-19 (Brennan dissenting).
107 Justice Blackmun, who wrote for the Court in Santosky, joined in Brennan's dis-

sent in Bowen. Id at 634 (Blackmun dissenting) ("I am in general agreement with much of
what Justice Brennan has said."). The fact that the author of the Court's opinion in Santosky agreed with Justice Brennan's description of the child and parent's reciprocal rights
in Bowen reinforces the plausibility of this Comment's interpretation of Santosky. In
particular, Blackmun, writing for the Court in Santosky, focused primarily on the implications of termination with regards to the rights of the parents, while merely noting the
possible implications for the child. But in Bowen, Blackmun apparently agreed with
Brennan that the child's reciprocal rights in the parent-child relationship were equally
fundamental. That agreement suggests that Blackmun's focus on the parent's rights in
Santosky was not a product of the greater fundamental importance of the parent's rights.
Instead, Blackmun's focus on the parents was reasonable given the specific question
presented in that case: the appropriate standard of proof at the parental unfitness stage
of the termination proceedings.
1o8 Id.
109 Bowen, 483 US at 594.
110 Id.
I" Id at 603.
112 Id.
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ing the family's living arrangements, the government had in fact
"intruded deeply" into the child's relationships with his or her
parents. 113 The fundamental conflict between the majority and
Justice Brennan, therefore, lay in a dispute regarding the nature
of the government's action, and not the nature of the rights at
stake." 4 Consequently, while not binding, Justice Brennan's dissent provides an illuminating statement on the fundamental nature of the child's rights to the full range of material and emotional support that a natural parent might provide.
Brennan began with the premise that "the child has a right
to rely on the unique contribution of each parent to material and
emotional support."1 5 He then argued that because the child has
a fundamental interest in continued parental care and support,
the child also has a right to protection from governmental actions
that would jeopardize those interests." 6 Brennan elaborated that
the benefits to the child of a parent's support are both "financial
and emotional," because the parent's support represents an important way in which a parent can contribute to raising a
child." 7 Consequently, the parent is entitled to support the child,
and the child is entitled to support from the parent." 8
Again, the majority in Bowen did not dispute these principles, but held instead that the government's welfare scheme had
not substantially interfered with or burdened the family interests at stake. 1 9 Arguably, the Court thus implicitly accepted Justice Brennan's characterization of the child's rights as fundamental and reciprocal with the parents' rights. 20 Still, the Court has
113 Bowen, 483 US at 611 (Brennan dissenting).
114 See id at 601-02 (holding that the scheme did not directly intrude on choices concerning family living arrangements despite the fact that some families may decide to
modify their living arrangements in order to avoid the scheme's effects). See also id at 602
n 17 ("[T]hese types of incentives are the unintended consequences of many social welfare
programs, and do not call the legitimacy of the programs into question."). In contrast,
Justice Brennan argued that because the children themselves did not wish to seek public
assistance, but would be included in the filing unit of their custodial parent's household,
the scheme forced children to choose which parent to live with on the basis of whether
other members of the parents' households desired public assistance. Id at 625 (Brennan
dissenting).
115 Bowen, 483 US at 612-13.
116 Id at 613.
117 Id at 615.
118 Id at 619 (Brennan dissenting).
119 Bowen, 483 US at 601-02.
120 At the least, the Court certainly left open the issue of what the Constitution would
require from a state seeking to more directly interfere with those rights, as in a termination proceeding.
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not yet adopted this proposition directly, in this or any other context.
3.

The Court has implied, but never stated, that a child has
a liberty interest in maintaininga relationshipwith its
naturalparents.

The Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the
121
nature of a child's liberty interests in preserving family bonds.
Nonetheless, as in Bowen, several of the Court's other statements support the inference that the child does have such liberty
interests, and that these liberty interests merit constitutional
protection from direct and unnecessary interference.
In Quilloin, the Court acknowledged the potential relevance
of the child's interests in a due process context. In dicta, the
Court stated:
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would
be offended if a State were to attempt to force the breakup
of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and
their children, without some showing of unfitness and for
the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the chil122
dren's best interest.
This statement might imply that when children object to the dissolution of their natural families, they assert liberty interests
that merit due process protection. Unfortunately, the Court
made this statement in dicta and did not explain what weight a
court should afford to the child's objections in such a scenario.
In Santosky, the Court stated that "the child and his parents
share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of
their natural relationship."1 23 Since the Court held that the parents' interests warranted due process protection, describing
these interests as shared and vital arguably implies that the
121 Troxel, 530 US at 88 (Stevens dissenting). See also Michael H v Gerald D, 491 US
110, 130 (1989) ("We have never had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty
interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship. We
need not do so here."); James Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State
Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 845, 846-47 (2003)
("One stark and remarkable fact that should be noted at the outset, however, is that in
none of the areas of law addressed in this Article have United States courts attributed to
children a constitutional right of any kind against the state when the state assumes and
exercises the awesome power of determining their intimate associations.").
122 Quilloin, 434 US at 255 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added).
123 Santosky, 455 US at 760.
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child's interests also merit such protection. 124 Moreover, as the
Court explained in Santosky, these interests could include the
child's rights to support, inheritance, and a relationship with his
or her natural parent. 125 The Court held in the equal protection
context that once the state accepts a role in protecting such
rights, the child's relevant interests are sufficiently fundamental
to warrant Fourteenth Amendment protection. 126 The Court's
enumeration of these rights in Santosky implies, therefore, that
these interests warrant the same protection in the due process
127
context.
Admittedly, however, none of these statements clearly establish that the child has ongoing, fundamental, and thus constitutionally protected, interests at stake in termination proceedings.
But the Court has not made a contradictory ruling, and the Supreme Court consistently has found that children have such interests in the equal protection context. 28 Consequently, a court
determining the government's burden of proof at the best interests stage of a termination of parental rights proceeding should
assume that the child's relevant interests are sufficiently funda129
mental to warrant due process protection.

124 See Troxel, 530 US at 88 (Stevens dissenting) ("[Ilt seems to me extremely likely
that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving
such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests."); Michael H, 491
US at 131 ("[I]f we were to construe [the child's] argument as forwarding the... proposition that.., she has a liberty interest in maintaining a filial relationship with her natural father ... we find that, at best, her claim is the obverse of [the father's].).
125 Santosky, 455 US at 760 n 11.
126 See Part 11 A 1.
127 Of course, in the illegitimacy cases, the child could expect no compensation in
return for a denial of his or her rights. In contrast, in at least some termination cases,
particularly those in preparation for adoption, the child may obtain a net benefit from
termination. But prior to a judicial finding that termination would serve the child's best
interests, a court should not assume that the child will receive a net benefit from termination. See Part III B.
128 See Part II A 1.
129 See Raymond O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children
Versus Parents, 26 Conn L Rev 1209, 1247-56 (1994) (reviewing the expanding recognition of children's constitutional rights and arguing that the due process rights of children
should be the focus of the balancing test required by Santosky). O'Brien argues that the
Court's analysis in Santosky was flawed because the Court ignored the due process rights
of the child. Id at 1254-55. He concludes that we should allow states to address the best
interests of the child through the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in
termination proceedings. Id at 1260. Obviously, this Comment agrees that courts should
focus on the child's due process rights at the best interests stage, but reaches a different
conclusion about the appropriate standard of proof for the government in such proceedings.

576

B.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2004:

Reapplying the Santosky Framework: A Requirement of
Clear and Convincing Evidence

Because the child has fundamental interests at stake in a
termination proceeding, a court should reapply the Santosky
framework at the best interests stage in order to determine the
appropriate burden of proof for the government in such proceedings. The Santosky framework requires a court to consider and
balance the three Mathews factors: the private interests at stake,
the risk of error, and the state's interests in the outcome and nature of the proceedings. 130 Prior to a judicial finding that termination would serve the child's best interests, a court should assume that the child has fundamental interests at stake. A court
also should conclude that the risk of error remains unbalanced
and that the state still has not established an interest in termination. Consequently, balancing these three factors should lead a
court to conclude that the government should have the burden of
131
proving its allegations by clear and convincing evidence.
1.

The private interestsat stake remain fundamental.

Under the Santosky framework, "[wihether the loss threatened by a particular type of proceeding is sufficiently grave to
warrant more than average certainty on the part of the factfinder turns on both the nature of the private interest threatened
130 See Part IA.
131 In a recent case, the Illinois Appellate Court also attempted to reapply the Santosky framework, and concluded that a preponderance of the evidence standard was constitutionally sufficient. DT, 788 NE2d at 149-51. Nonetheless, the Illinois court's analysis
failed to follow the guidance provided by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Illinois court
stated that the child "has an important interest in a loving, stable and safe home environment, which may not involve any relationship with her natural parent." Id at 149.
This argument fails to consider the other rights the child has at stake in a best interests
hearing. The court's misconception of the child's rights arose again in its analysis of the
second factor, the risk of error. The court stated that "we must balance the rights of the
child versus the rights of the parent to determine who should shoulder the risk of error at
the best interest hearing." Id at 150. Again, the court failed to consider that the child also
has rights at stake in the best interest hearing that will be unduly infringed if the court
erroneously terminates the parent's rights. Finally, the court mischaracterized the state's
interests in a best interests hearing. The court claimed that the state has an interest "in
terminating the natural parent's rights after he or she has been found unfit." Id. In fact,
although the state has an interest in the welfare of the child, the state does not have an
interest in terminating parental rights until it has been clearly shown that doing so
would serve the best interests of the child. Consequently, when a court determines the
appropriate standard of proof in a best interest hearing, it should not assume that the
government in its role as a petitioner for termination of parental rights is necessarily
serving the best interests of the child.
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and the permanency of the threatened loss."1 32 As the Court
noted, in a termination of parental rights proceeding, the child
has many interests at stake, and a termination of parental rights
may permanently terminate these reciprocal rights. 133 Moreover,
because the Court has held that a state cannot limit the child's
rights simply because the parents are wrongdoers, 134 a finding of
parental unfitness should not automatically serve as a ground for
a termination of the child's rights. Of course, the same facts that
support a finding of parental unfitness may bear on the issue of
whether a termination of the child's rights would serve the
child's best interests. 135 Nonetheless, the Court held in the equal
protection context that the child should have an adequate opportunity to assert those rights. 136 Consequently, after a judicial
finding of parental unfitness, but before a finding that termination would serve the best interests of the child, a court determining the government's burden of proof at the best interests stage
should provide due process protection to the liberty interests of
the child.
Because the child's interests are fundamental, this factor,
viewed in isolation, suggests that a court should require the government to prove its best interests allegations by at least clear
and convincing evidence. 137 If a parent's interest in preserving a
relationship with his or her child is sufficiently fundamental to
warrant heightened procedural protection, then the child's reciprocal interest in preserving that relationship should warrant at
least equivalent protection.
2.

The risk of errorremains unbalanced.

Under the second Mathews factor, a court must consider the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interests at stake
132

Santosky, 455 US at 758.

By "reciprocal rights," this Comment means all of the legal rights that the child
will lose as a consequence of a termination of the parent's rights. See id at 760 n 11 (providing examples of the rights a child could lose as the result of a termination of parental
rights). See also Part II A 2 (discussing the reciprocal relationship between the parent's
right and the child's rights).
134 See Part 11 A 1.
135 See In re Trejo, 612 NW2d 407, 411 n 6 (Mich 2000) (describing the overlap between the facts relevant to parental unfitness and the best interests of the child).
136 See Part 11 A 1.
137 Again, the state may allege that the child can expect adequate compensation from
an alternative parent, but that is one of the allegations the state should have to prove.
See Part III B.
133

578

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2004:

given the preponderance standard, and the likelihood that a
higher evidentiary standard would reduce that risk. 138 The Court
in Santosky essentially made two separate findings related to the
risk of error: one involving accuracy, and the other involving the
severity of the consequences of possible errors. 139 First, the Court
found that in the practical context of termination proceedings, a
court's use of the preponderance standard would increase the
likelihood of an erroneous termination. 40 Second, the Court
found that the consequences of an erroneous termination would
likely be more severe than the consequences of an erroneous fail14
ure to terminate. '
At least the first of these findings applies to the litigation at
the best interests stage as well as at the unfitness stage. At the
best interests stage, termination proceedings also "employ imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge." 142 Moreover, a
best interests hearing will suffer from the same cultural or class
biases as a parental unfitness hearing. 4 3 Given the Court's
analysis of such factors in Santosky, the imprecision of the best
interests standard and the potential for bias when factfinders
apply this standard suggest that a court should require the gov138 Santosky, 455 US at 761.
139 Id at 761-66.
140 Id at 764.
141 Id at 765-66.
142 See Santosky, 455 US at 762 (describing termination proceedings in general). See
also Annette Appell and Bruce Boyer, Parental Rights vs Best Interests of the Child: A
False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 Duke J Gender L & Pol 63, 66 (1995) (arguing that the best interests standard is "exceptionally vulnerable to arbitrary decisionmaking" and offers little guidance to courts). One commentator has argued that terminations
of parental rights should be restricted to the goal of requiring parental fitness, not "extended to protect the relative and potentially imprecise 'best interest' of the child." Note,
Unified Family Courts and the Child Protection Dilemma, 116 Harv L Rev 2099, 2119
(2003). That model of parental rights termination proceedings, however, would fail to
protect the child's fundamental interests. See Part III A.
143 See Smith v Organizationof FosterFamiliesFor Equality and Reform, 431 US 816,
834 (1977) (finding that studies suggest that social workers of middle-class backgrounds,
perhaps unconsciously, favor placement with a higher-status foster family over return to
a lower-status natural family, "reflecting a bias that treats the natural parents' poverty
and lifestyle as prejudicial to the best interests of the child"); Wexler, 36 New Eng L Rev
at 129-34 (cited in note 9) (arguing that the child protection system after ASFA is likely
to be biased against the poor, with factfinders often confusing poverty with neglect);
Bruce A. Boyer and Steven Lubet, The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara: Contemporary
Lessons in the Child Welfare Wars, 45 Vill L Rev 245, 246 (2000) ("In practice, the best
interest of a child may not be so easy to recognize, and cultural, ethnic or religious biases
may muddy the decision."); Appell and Boyer, 2 Duke J Gender L & Pol at 79-80 (cited in
note 142) (advocating caution regarding the best interests standard because of its potential to adversely impact poor people and people of color).
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ernment to meet a heightened standard of proof in a best interests hearing. Similarly, the disparity of resources noted by the
Court in Santosky, such as the lack of limits on government expenditures, the government's full access to all public records, and
the government's ability to call experts, including the caseworkers whom the state empowered to investigate the family situation, will exist at the best interests stage as well. 144 Finally, because a parent cannot use a double jeopardy defense against repeated termination efforts, the government repeatedly can at145
tempt to remedy its failure to terminate parental rights.
Given that the same asymmetries exist at the unfitness and
best interests stages of a termination proceeding, raising the
government's standard of proof at the best interests stage would
have the same practical and symbolic effects as raising the government's standard at the unfitness stage. As the Court noted in
Santosky, when there is such an imbalance between the litigants,
the preponderance standard, which "by its very terms demands
consideration of the quantity, rather than the quality, of the evidence may misdirect the factfinder in the marginal case." 1 46 Accordingly, a heightened standard of proof, as in criminal proceedings, may reduce the risk of terminations based on factual error. 14 Additionally, a heightened standard of proof is one way to
"impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision and
thereby perhaps to reduce the chances that inappropriate terminations will be ordered." 148 In general, because the state, as a
party to the litigation, typically has an overwhelming advantage
over its adversary, a court should impose on the state a heightened burden of proof in order to maintain an accurate process.
An erroneous termination, in contrast, may not produce a
more severe outcome than an erroneous failure to terminate. The
Court in Santosky reasoned that an erroneous termination would
result, for the parents, in an unnecessary destruction of their
natural family. 149 The Court also found that, for the child, an erroneous failure to terminate would likely lead only to the preservation of the child's status quo, because usually the child would
144 See Stack, Lives on Layaway, Part Four (cited in note 4) (describing the testimony
of caseworkers in a termination proceeding).
145 Santosky, 455 US at 764.
146

Id.

Id.
148 Id at 764-65 (internal quotation omitted).
149 Santosky, 455 US at 766.
147
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remain in the care of an agency or a foster home. 50 The Court's
second finding was somewhat perplexing, because termination is
sometimes a precondition for a change in the child's placement,
such as when termination would enable an adoption. 151 Accordingly, an erroneous failure to terminate could prevent a planned
change in a child's status, which, for the child, may cause serious
consequences.
Still, in the context of an unfitness hearing, a court must
consider the severity of the possible errors for both the natural
parents and for the child. Presumably, the natural parents will
receive no compensatory benefits following an erroneous termination. Once a factfinder has found the natural parents to be unfit, however, a court may reason that the consequences for the
natural parents no longer merit significant consideration. 1 52 At
the best interests stage, therefore, a court should not assume
that an erroneous termination has more severe consequences
than an erroneous failure to terminate, because only the child's
interests are at stake, and determining what would best serve
the child's interests is the purpose of the hearing.
Nonetheless, for the same reasons, a court should not assume that the severity of the consequences of erroneous terminations is less than the severity of erroneous failures to terminate.
Although a termination may precipitate a change in the child's
status quo that will benefit the child, that issue remains unresolved prior to a best interests determination. 5 3 In fact, by definition, an erroneous termination at the best interests stage
would result in a termination that does not serve the child's best
150 Id at 765-66.
151 See Stack, Lives on Layaway, Part Four (cited in note 4) (noting that the government was seeking termination in part because the foster parents wanted to adopt the
children). But see Wexler, 36 New Eng L Rev at 145 (cited in note 9) (arguing that recent
state efforts to expedite termination of parental rights are creating a generation of "legal
orphans" with neither ties to birth parents nor adoptive homes, and that ASFA is causing
this problem to spread).
152 See DT, 788 NE2d at 150 ("Once a finding of unfitness has been made, all considerations, including the parent's rights, must yield to the best interest of the child.").
153 Particularly following the passage of ASFA, a court should not assume that a termination sought by the government actually will serve the best interests of the child. See
Wexler, 36 New Eng L Rev at 144-46 (cited in note 9) (arguing that expedited terminations are creating a generation of "legal orphans" and that ASFA creates a "perverse
incentive for quick-and-dirty, slipshod placements that are more likely to fail");
Freundlich, 28 Cap U L Rev at 105-10 (cited in note 11) (also arguing that expedited
terminations may result in a group of legal orphans and a growing group of children
affected by adoption disruption, and further arguing that expedited involuntary terminations may work against positive outcomes for children by foreclosing their opportunities
to maintain ties with their birth families following adoption).
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interests. Conversely, an erroneous failure to terminate would be
a failure to terminate when termination would serve the child's
best interests. Consequently, even considering only the child's
interests, prior to a judicial finding that termination would serve
the child's best interests, the relative severity of the two possible
errors remains undetermined.
Given that the state has an overwhelming advantage in the
context of the litigation, the preponderance standard would lead
to a greater likelihood of erroneous terminations. Thus, even
considering only the child's interests and acknowledging the possibility of a beneficial change from the child's status quo, a court
should require the state to meet a heightened burden of proof.
Doing so would improve the accuracy of the termination process
and would not violate any valid assumptions about the relative
severity of the possible errors.
3.

The state does not have an interest that favors
termination,and a heightened standardwould not
unduly burden the government.

The Court in Santosky identified two state interests at stake
in parental rights termination proceedings: (1) an interest in
promoting the welfare of the child, and (2) an interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings. 15 4 The Court noted
that "[s]ince the State has an urgent interest in the welfare of
the child, it shares the parent's interest in an accurate and just
decision at the factfinding proceeding." 155 The Court further recognized that separating children from the custody of fit parents
56
does not further the state's interests.
The same pattern of reasoning applies at the best interests
stage. As the Court found, "[elven when a child's natural home is
imperfect, permanent removal from that home will not necessarily improve his welfare." 57 Consequently, the state does not further its goal of promoting the welfare of the child by terminating
parental rights when permanent removal from the parents' home
would not serve the best interests of the child. Instead, the
154 Santosky, 455 US at 766.
155 Id, citing Lassiter v Department of Social Services, 452 US 18, 27 (1981) (internal
quotation omitted).
156 Santosky, 455 US at 767, citing Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 652 (1972).
157 Santosky, 455 US at 765 n 15. See also Wexler, 36 New Eng L Rev at 138-46 (cited
in note 9) (arguing that a family preservation model is both safer and more effective than
ASFA's "take the child and run" mentality).
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state's compelling interest in terminating parental rights arises
only when doing so would serve the best interests of the child. As
a result, courts can best serve the state's interest in the welfare
of the child by using procedures that promote an accurate determination of whether a termination of parental rights would serve
158
the child's best interests.
Addressing the state's interest in reducing administrative
costs, the Court in Santosky noted that a stricter standard of
proof in parental rights termination hearings would reduce factual errors without imposing substantial burdens on the state. 159
As the Court observed, many states had already adopted higher
standards at the factfinding stage, without apparent effect on the
speed or cost of their proceedings. 160 Moreover, family court
judges in New York used a higher evidentiary standard in parental rights termination proceedings involving parents with mental
illnesses or allegations of child abuse. 16' Additionally, New York
required clear and convincing evidence "in proceedings of far less
moment than parental rights termination proceedings," such as
traffic infraction hearings. 62 The Court concluded that "[w]e cannot believe that it would burden the State unduly to require that
its factfinders have the same factual certainty when terminating
the parent-child relationship as they must have to suspend a
1 63
driver's license."
Similarly, requiring the state to provide clear and convincing
evidence at the best interests stage would not unduly burden the
state. In fact, many states already have adopted a heightened
158 Because ASFA requires that the state seek termination as soon as fifteen months
after the child first enters the child welfare system, the courts should be wary about
assuming that granting the government's petition for termination would serve the state's
interest in the child's welfare. In short, ASFA's requirements may not be based on a
sound analysis of what would benefit children in foster care. See Wexler, 36 New Eng L
Rev at 149 (cited in note 9) (arguing that irrational "foster care panics" forced Congress
into passing ASFA). Of course, a prior finding of parental unfitness may be relevant to
the issues at the best interests stage, but a finding of unfitness does not necessarily imply
that termination is more likely to benefit the child. See Part III A. Requiring the state to
prove all of its best interests allegations clearly and convincingly will, therefore, promote
an accurate determination of whether termination would further the state's interest in
the welfare of the child. See Part II B 2.
159 Santosky, 455 US at 767.
160 Id.

161 Id (noting New York law required "clear and convincing proof' before parental
rights could be terminated for mental illness and mental retardation or severe and repeated child abuse).
162 Id at 767-68.
163 Santosky, 455 US at 768.
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standard for best interest hearings. 6 4 Following Santosky, all
family courts must apply at least the clear and convincing standard when adjudicating claims of parental unfitness. 165 Consequently, requiring a court to have the same factual certainty
about the best interests of the child should not unduly burden
the state. In fact, doing so would promote more accurate determinations at the best interests stage, and thus would serve the
interests of the state itself.
4. Balancing the three Santosky factors leads to the
conclusion that a court should require the government to
prove its allegationsat the best interests stage by "clear
and convincing evidence."
The Court in Santosky balanced the three Mathews factors
and held that the use of the preponderance of evidence standard
at the factfinding stage violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 166 Balancing the three factors at the
best interests stage also leads to the conclusion that because the
child has fundamental interests at stake in a best interests proceeding, using the preponderance of evidence standard at the
best interests stage violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Applying the first Mathews factor, the child has fundamental interests at stake in a termination proceeding that merit
heightened protection. Applying the second Mathews factor, because of the likelihood of an imbalance between the government
and parents, a greater likelihood of erroneous terminations
would arise in a best interests proceeding if a court only required
the government to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard. Applying the third Mathews factor, the state's interest in
termination should arise only after the government has shown
that termination would serve the child's best interests. Furthermore, a heightened standard should not unduly burden the state.
Balancing these factors, therefore, a court should require the
state to show by clear and convincing evidence that a termination of parental rights, and the consequent termination of the
child's reciprocal rights, would serve the best interests of the
child. Such a rule would result in the most accurate process and
164 See DT, 788 NE2d at 148 (identifying ten states which impose a clear and convincing evidence standard at the best interests stage).
165 Santosky, 455 US at 769.
166 Id at 768.
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would impress on the factfinder the fundamental importance of a
decision to terminate the reciprocal rights of a parent and child.
III. REPLIES TO COUNTERARGUMENTS
A termination proceeding should reach the best interests
stage only after a judicial finding of parental unfitness based on
clear and convincing evidence. 167 Some might argue, therefore,
that a court need not require the government to meet a heightened standard of proof at the best interests stage because the
government already has met such a standard at the unfitness
stage. Indeed, on the basis of an assumption that the termination
of an unfit parent's rights almost always will be in the child's
best interests, some might argue that requiring the government
to meet a higher standard would contravene the child's best interests.
In actuality, a finding of parental unfitness does not show
that termination necessarily serves the child's best interests.
Moreover, an accurate determination of whether termination
would serve the child's best interests serves the interests of the
state. Accordingly, by requiring the government to prove its best
interest allegations by clear and convincing evidence, a court
serves the interests of both the child and the state.
A.

Findings of Parental Unfitness as Sufficient Grounds for
Termination

One possible argument against placing a heightened standard of proof on the state at the best interests stage is that doing
so is unnecessary, given a finding of parental unfitness at the
initial stage. This argument stems from the premise that a finding of parental unfitness amounts to a finding that the child's
reciprocal rights, such as the rights to support, inheritance, and
a relationship with the parent, no longer amount to significant
and fundamental interests. This argument, however, fails to consider the full range of the child's fundamental interests and the
role of the unfitness stage in the termination process.
The rights of a child at stake in a termination proceeding
may encompass a wide range of material, emotional, and relational interests. 168 Accordingly, states would have to draw the
167 See Quilloin, 434 US at 255.
168 See Part II A.
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sufficient statutory grounds for parental unfitness very broadly
in order to have each ground fully consider the child's potential
interests. In fact, states typically focus the individual grounds for
parental unfitness on only a subset of the possible issues.
For example, in Illinois, one of the sufficient grounds for a
finding of parental unfitness iL a "[flailure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's
welfare." 16 9 A lack of appropriate interest or concern may amount
to a reasonable ground for finding that the natural parent is unfit to raise a child. 170 The natural parent's lack of concern may
also provide a reasonable ground for concluding that the child
would not benefit greatly from exercising his or her right to emotional support from the parent. Such a finding does not imply,
however, that the child has no ongoing interest in preserving his
or her judicially enforceable rights to material support or inheritance from such a parent.
In Michigan, if a court finds that "Itihe parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child
and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be
able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time
considering the child's age," this finding creates a sufficient
ground for a declaration of parental unfitness.' 71 Again, such a
finding may provide a sufficient reason to believe that the child
would not benefit from returning to the care and custody of the
natural parent. Nonetheless, the birth parent may have the capacity to provide substantial emotional support through an ongo72
ing relationship with the child.
Findings of unfitness, of course, undoubtedly bear on the
best interests question. Particularly in cases where an alternative, fit parent wants to adopt the child, a finding of unfitness
may incline a court to decide that termination would serve the
child's best interests. 73 Nonetheless, these findings alone do not
169 750 ILCS 50/1 § 1D(b) (West 2003).
170 750 ILCS 50/1 § ID (West 2003) ("Unfit person' means any person whom the court
shall find to be unfit to have a child.").
171 Mich Comp Laws Ann § 712A19b(3)(g) (West 2003).
172 See Part II A 2. See also Freundlich, 28 Cap U L Rev at 106-07 (cited in note 11)
(arguing that when a child has relationships with birth family members, a complete severance of the child's connection with his or her birth family may work against positive
outcomes for the child).
173 Nonetheless, a court should still consider whether the child's best interests would
be better served by an adoption coupled with an ongoing relationship with the birth parent. See Freundlich, 28 Cap U L Rev at 106-07 (cited in note 11).
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sufficiently address all of the possible issues that may arise at a
174
best interests hearing.
Indeed, in light of the relevant Supreme Court decisions, it
is unsurprising that these statutory grounds for parental unfitness do not attempt to provide a comprehensive dismissal of the
child's potential interests. In Quilloin, the Court held that due
process, as applied to the parent's fundamental liberty interests,
would not allow a court to consider whether termination would
serve the child's best interests until after a court makes a finding
of parental unfitness. 175 In Santosky, the Court held that a court
must clearly establish parental unfitness before considering
whether the interests of the child and parents diverge. 76 Given
these holdings, the unfitness hearing does not result in a finding
that terminating the child's relationship with the natural parent
would, on balance, best serve the child's fundamental interests.
Instead, these holdings mandate a two-step process: the state
first must show parental unfitness, and only then may a court
consider the state's allegation that termination would serve the
best interests of the child.
The Court recently has reinforced this constitutionally mandated limit on a court's ability to become involved in adjudicating
the best interests of the child. In Troxel v Granville, 77 the Supreme Court held that a court that enforced a state law by ordering increased visitation by a child's grandparents, against the
wishes of the child's mother, and solely on the grounds that the
court believed that the children would benefit from increased
visitation, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 78 The Court
noted that no court had found that the mother was an unfit parent. 79 The Court emphasized the importance of this aspect of the
174 In Illinois, for example, when determining whether termination serves a child's
best interests, a court must consider, in the context of the child's age and developmental
needs, the following factors: (1) the child's physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child's identity; (3) his background and ties, including familial, cultural and
religious issues; (4) his sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, and
continuity of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) his wishes; (6)
his community ties; (7) his need for permanence, including his need for stability and
continuity of relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every
family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the
persons available to care for the child. DT, 788 NE2d at 144-45.
175 Quilloin, 434 US at 255.
176 Santosky, 455 US at 760.
177 530 US 57 (2000).
178 Id at 72-73.
179 Id at 68.
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case, because there is a "presumption that fit parents act in the
best interests of their children." 80 Accordingly, the Court held
that as long as parents adequately care for their children, the
state will have no reason "to inject itself into the private realm of
the family" because it will have no reason to question the ability
of those parents to make the best decisions concerning their chil18
dren. '
A finding under a statutory ground for unfitness, therefore,
must provide a court with a sufficient reason to set aside the presumption that parents normally act in the best interests of their
children. A statutory ground that a natural parent has failed to
maintain a reasonable interest or concern regarding the welfare
of his or her child, or a ground that a natural parent, regardless
of intent, has failed to provide proper care for his or her child, is
appropriately tailored when a finding of unfitness aims only to
18 2
set aside the presumption of parental competence.
Given the limited purpose of the unfitness stage of a termination proceeding, each sufficient ground for unfitness need not
address every issue that may arise at the best interests stage.
Accordingly, insofar as the state must still provide allegations on
any such remaining issues, a court must still set a burden of
proof for the state. Following the logic of the Court in Santosky,
it may be particularly likely that parents found to be unfit will
face a disadvantage when litigating the remaining best interests
issues. Consequently, requiring the state to prove its remaining
allegations by clear and convincing evidence would be consistent
with the two-step termination process.
B.

Endangering the Child or Giving Insufficient Weight to the
Possible Benefits of Termination

Another argument against requiring the state to meet a
heightened standard of proof at the best interests stage of a termination proceeding is that implementing such a standard would
endanger the children of unfit parents. Similarly, some might
argue that a heightened standard would give insufficient weight
to the possibility that a child of unfit parents might benefit from
150 Id.
18' Troxel, 530 US at 68-69.
182 Consider id at 68 (recognizing that "natural bonds of affection" lead parents to act
in their children's best interests and equating parental fitness with providing adequate
care) (internal citation omitted).
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termination, particularly in cases where adoption is certain, or at
least likely. Both of these arguments suggest that given a
slightly greater chance that the best interests of the child would
be served by termination, the state has a sufficient reason to terminate parental rights. Consequently, a preponderance of the
evidence standard, which the Supreme Court has interpreted as
requiring the trier of fact to believe simply that an allegation is
more likely to be true than not,1 8 3 might be appropriate.
The flaw in these arguments is that they fail to consider that
the Court in Santosky found that a heightened standard would
improve the accuracy of termination proceedings. 8 4 Moreover,
the Court also found that a heightened standard impresses on
the factfinder the importance of the decision, and held that the
85
gravity of termination proceedings merits such a standard.
The Court's main reasons for favoring a heightened standard did
not depend, therefore, on an imbalance between the severity of
the possible outcomes. Instead, the Court relied on the imbalance
between the parties to the litigation, and on the importance of
making an accurate determination when dealing with fundamen86
tal interests.
The Court in Santosky found that in the context of parental
rights termination proceedings, the asymmetries between the
parties makes it very likely that the government has an unbalanced advantage in the litigation. 8 7 Consequently, the preponderance of evidence standard would result in a greater likelihood
88
of erroneous terminations than of erroneous non-terminations.
89
The same reasoning should apply at the best interests stage.
Since at the best interests hearing, a court has yet to determine
183 See In re Winship, 397 US 368, 370 (1970) (Harlan concurring) (stating that the
preponderance of the evidence standard requires the factfinder to believe that the existence of an alleged fact is more probable than its nonexistence before finding in favor of
the party who has the burden of persuasion).
184 See Santosky, 455 US at 764-65.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 Id at 762-64.
188 Consider Santosky, 455 US at 762-64. Although the Court did not state explicitly
that the likelihood of an erroneous termination is greater than the likelihood of an erroneous non-termination given a preponderance of the evidence standard, the errorproducing factors that the Court identified increase the risk that the state will satisfy its
burden erroneously. In contrast, those factors do not increase the risk that the state will
fail to satisfy its burden erroneously. The Court's analysis, therefore, implies that the
error-producing factors common to termination proceedings asymmetrically increase the
likelihood of only erroneous terminations.
189 See Part II B 2.
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whether termination would serve the child's best interests, a
court should not assume that this asymmetry in the likelihood of
errors is outweighed by an asymmetry in the child's interests.
Consequently, requiring the government to meet a higher burden
of proof actually results in the proper balance of risk between
termination and non-termination, since a higher standard corrects the practical imbalance between the likelihood of the two
different sorts of errors.
Moreover, the Court found that the clear and convincing evidence standard impresses on the factfinder the importance of the
decision. 190 Although the child ultimately may benefit from termination, termination still involves the child's fundamental liberty interests. 19' Termination can permanently extinguish the
child's rights in regard to the natural parents, and likely precludes any possibility of an ongoing relationship between the
child and the natural parents. 192 Accordingly, even though the
government has alleged that the child will benefit from this significant change in the child's rights, a court deciding the standard of proof should seek to impress the factfinder with the fun.damental importance of the termination decision. A heightened
standard would properly achieve that goal.
This logic accords with the Court's analysis of the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard in Addington. In Addington, the
Court considered an involuntary civil commitment hearing on
the grounds of mental illness. 93 The Court found that the state's
interest in commitment stemmed, in part, from its interest in the
health and welfare of the individual involved. 94 Nonetheless, the
Court observed that "[alt one time or another every person exhibits some abnormal behavior which might be perceived by some as
symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in
fact within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 195
The Court then found that this possibility created a risk that a
factfinder might commit an individual solely because of "a few
isolated instances of unusual conduct." 96 Consequently, the
Court found that increasing the burden of proof, and thus "im190
191
192
193

Santosky, 455 US at 764-65.
See Part II A.
Santosky, 455 US at 760 n 11.
Addington, 441 US at 426.

194 Id.

195 Id at 426-27.
196 Id at 427.
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press[ing] the factfinder with the importance of the decision,"
197
would reduce the likelihood of inappropriate commitments.
Moreover, because the individual's interest in the outcome of a
civil commitment proceeding was of sufficient "weight and gravity," the Court found that due process required the government
to prove, with more substantial evidence than a preponderance
standard would require, the need for confinement. 98 Consequently, the Court held that a court must apply a "clear and convincing evidence" standard in such cases. 199
The Court's findings in Addington imply that a factfinder's
use of the preponderance standard, rather than a heightened
standard, results in less accurate findings when the government,
as a party, faces an adversary with a severe disadvantage in the
litigation process. The preponderance standard is less accurate
in this context because the government's adversary cannot force
20 0
the government to produce sufficiently substantial evidence.
Given that children have fundamental interests at stake in a
termination proceeding, it is equally appropriate to require the
government to provide similarly substantial evidence before the
state can permanently terminate a child's relationship with his
or her natural parent. Of course, as with civil commitments, the
government alleges that termination would serve the affected
party's best interests. Nonetheless, the state shares the child's
interest in an accurate determination of this issue, and the Supreme Court's prior findings imply that an accurate determination in these circumstances requires a heightened standard of
20
proof.
Consider, for example, the case discussed at the beginning of
this Comment. The government petitioned for termination of Angela Edwards's parental rights and, as the Court predicted in
Santosky, the government's witnesses provided all of the crucial
2 02
testimony about Edwards's relationship with her daughters.
197 Addington, 441 US at 427.
198 Id.
199 Id at 425.
200 See also Santosky, 455 US at 764 (finding that a standard of proof that requires
consideration of the quantity rather than the quality of the evidence may misdirect the
factfinder in the marginal case). This finding implies that a requirement for evidence of a
certain quality, like the substantiality requirement considered in Addington, may be
missed by the preponderance of the evidence standard when the adverse party is unable
to compete on even terms with the government.
201 See Part II B 2.

202 See Stack, Lives on Layaway, PartFour (cited in note 4).
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Given that the government petitioned for termination, the government's own witnesses were unlikely to testify that continuing
the girls' relationship with Edwards would further their interests
more than terminating that relationship. Indeed, even the psychologist provided by the government, who had doubts about the
neutrality of the state's caseworkers after his "surprising"
203
evaluation, did not contradict the government's allegations.
The court could not give the children's interest in a relationship with Edwards fair consideration merely by requiring the
government to provide slightly more convincing evidence on that
issue than Edwards could provide. Instead, the court would have
to require that the government provide sufficiently substantial
evidence to overcome the imbalance between the parties. The
clear and convincing evidence standard accomplishes this goal,
and also appropriately impresses on the court the importance of
the termination decision. In short, because the state and the
child share an interest in making sure that courts carefully consider petitions for termination, courts should require that the
government provide substantial evidence about the child's best
interests before making termination decisions.
CONCLUSION

The phrase "termination of parental rights" is incomplete,
because such a termination may also result in the permanent
loss of a child's reciprocal rights. Consequently, in termination
proceedings, courts must provide due process protection both to
the parents and to their children. The state should not be allowed to terminate the rights of children simply because the children's parents have been adjudged unfit. Instead, the state
should have to prove that terminating the child's reciprocal
rights would serve that child's best interests. Moreover, given the
wide variety of the child's fundamental interests at stake, the
factors making an erroneous termination more likely than an
erroneous non-termination, and the lack of a compelling state
interest until the best interests of the child have been determined, the appropriate standard of proof is "clear and convincing
evidence." As with civil commitments, the fact that the state is
allegedly acting in the interests of the child does not mean that
the government should have a lesser burden of proof at the best
interests stage. Instead, a heightened standard in this context
203

Id.
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would require simply that the government provide sufficiently
substantial evidence to overcome the practical imbalance between the litigants, and would impress on the factfinder the fundamental importance of termination decisions-not only for the
parents, but for the children and the state as well.

